Is Personality Determined by Nature or Nurture - 1623 Words

Crime and Punishment Essay Societal Rehabilitation Fyodor Dostoyevskys work in Crime and Punishment can be cited as largely autobiographical. Although the author never committed anything like the atrocious murders depicted in the novel, the nihilistic traits of his protagonist, Raskolnikov, closely resemble his own ideals as a youth. In 1947, Dostoyevsky joined the revolutionary Petrashevist cause. The author and this group of radical socialists narrowly escaped death after being arrested by police. They received a pardon from the czar only moments before a firing squad was to take aim. They were sentenced instead to four years in a Siberian labor camp. In his penal servitude Dostoyevsky examined his revolutionary†¦show more content†¦These extraordinary beings (led by their Dionysian tendencies) must rebel against the restraint of common Apollonians. After some sort of a revolution occurs, the radical Dionysian and the conservative Apollonian principles will synthesize into a middle ground. At the end of Raskolnikovs c onversation with Porfiry he comments that this revolutionary cycle will continue until the New Jerusalem (Dostoyevsk! y 314). This reference to a Utopian socialist paradise stresses Raskolnikovs liberal interest in communism. Communism is the complete antithesis to the czarist regime the conservative author hoped to preserve. Raskolnikovs radical theory fails him. As the book progresses, his senses leave him. He is driven by the guilt of his crime to near insanity. After becoming gravely ill, he discovers that he is not the Napoleon figure that he hoped to be. Because Raskolnikov is not able to get past the murder he committed, he concludes he is not one of the extraordinary. Raskolnikovs intense disappointment in his failure, his emotional and physical exhaustion, and prompting from Sonya to do ‘what is right leads him to confess himself. With Sonyas crucifix in hand, he goes to ‘bear his cross and accept his responsibility. In the novel, Dostoyevsky emphasizes the flaws o f Raskolnikovs radical objectives. When the main character is first imprisoned he felt no remorse for his crime (Dostoyevsky 623). All that he regrets is that he has failed to follow throughShow MoreRelatedNature vs. Nurture1117 Words   |  5 PagesThe nature versus nurture debate is one of the oldest issues in sociology (Davidson, 1991, n.p.). The debate centers on the relative contributions of genetics and environmental factors to human behavior (Davidson, 1991, n.p.). Today, the majority of experts believe that behavior and development are influenced by both nature and nurture (Macionis, 2009, p. 73). The biggest question now is which one affects human development more: nature or nurture? According to Macionis (2009, p. 72), in the pastRead MoreNature Vs. Nature : Nature And Nurture969 Words   |  4 Pagesare complicated and have complex personalities—and serial killers even more complex. Determining where these personalities come from, especially in serial killers, is a question of speculation asked by psychologists. One theory, nature, is that who people are is determined by genetics. Another theory, nurture, is that people are who they are because of environment. Both theories are in fact correct; however, the cause of personality is not solely nature or nurture, but on a case by case basis, canRead MoreThe Meaning of Nature and Nurture in Psychology Essay1192 Words   |  5 PagesThe Meaning of Nature and Nurture in Psychology The nature nurture dichotomy is a theme alw ays present in many areas of psychology. But is it right to talk about it as a dichotomy? , Certainly not. To say so would be like stating that they never act together, that they are contradictory and exclusive oneRead MoreNature versus Nurture Debate Essays776 Words   |  4 PagesFactually Naturally People have been arguing about nature versus nurture for centuries. Does genetics or upraising have more effect on a person? Human development is influenced by various things. But nature, genetics, contributes more to development than the environment does. While nurture has some influence, nature has much more. Genes are responsible for altruism, personality is linked to individual genes, and genetic disorders are effects of nature that can cause drastic differences in qualityRead MoreNature or Nurture: What Determines Our Behavior? Essay506 Words   |  3 Pagesis not the only explanation for how our lives are determined. The argument of nature versus nurture is still being discussed by many, although both have been seen to have an impact on our life experiences. The role of nature, by name, basically states that all human behavior is simply just instinctive, as if we are all encoded to act and react a certain way to life experiences. As the book states, through this side of the debate, it is our â€Å"nature† to do the things we do. This of course had its ownRead MoreThe Evolutionary Factors That Have Shaped The Genetics That We Inherit From Our Parents1049 Words   |  5 PagesINTRODUCTION NATURE This refers to all the evolutionary factors that have that have shaped the genetics that we inherit from our parents. Nature determine the range of our human potential.Naturists believe that the knowledge humans have about the world is innate. Therefore human development is determined by heredity. NURTURE This has to deal with our environment; it refers to all the environmental factors that have influenced us since we began to grow. Nurture affects the way our human potentialRead More Postion Paper: Nature Vs. Nurture712 Words   |  3 Pages Position Paper: Nature vs. Nurture nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;The controversy of nature vs. nurture has been going on for many years, and a decision has not yet been reached in which one is the most affective. Using the results of the countless tests done, everyday situations, and the twins experiment, I will prove that nature is a larger contributor to the outcome of our personalities than nurture. nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;nbsp;Firstly, many psychologists and Universities, such as Harvard,Read MoreThe Nature Nurture Controversy : Biological Or Environmental Effects Of Iq, Personality And Behavioral Differences932 Words   |  4 PagesThe basic elements of the nature-nurture controversy, debates the genetic or environmental effects of IQ, personality and behavioral differences in humans. Nature describes an inherited trait, otherwise known as the genes, containing the genetic code for each individual born. These genes contribute the physical characteristics, for example: eye color, skin pigmentation, hair texture, blood type, longevity, etc. Genes impose certain diseases, such as Huntington s Chorea, Breast Cancer, Down SyndromeRead MorePersonality Is Developed From Genes ( Nature ) Or Influenced By Environment ( Nurture ) Essay1436 Words   |  6 Pagesperson’s personality is developed from genes (nature) or influenced by environment (nurture). Personality is something ever y human has and is an essential element in their social world. This research is important to know if, how, and why personalities change. Different scholarly-based material was used to support either stance on the issue. The articles and research helped to decipher the roles of parents, genes, biology, the environment, experiences, and culture in a person’s personality. PersonalityRead MoreThe Influential Difference Between Environment And Heredity1610 Words   |  7 PagesOur personalities have many traits, and these traits made us who we are. But that’s not the whole story about it. We are not just similar because we have the same traits, but we are also uniquely different from our environment and heredity causes, or maybe our freewill and other unknown factors. Our personalities are so unique that we are the only person in this whole universe. No one else is the same, and even identical twins are different. We are us, and only us. So how does that work out? Why

Analysis Of The Wife Of Bath - 1660 Words

The Canterbury Fails: An Analysis of Misogyny in the Wife of Bath’s Tale At first glance, you wouldn’t think that the Wife of Bath’s tale is anything other than feminist. She is, undeniably, the only non-religious female character in The Canterbury Tales and therefore is the only character who is approached from a point of view that was generally uncommon. We don’t have many— or even any, as far as I’m aware— pieces of medieval literature written by or for women or with a main female protagonist. If there is a female character present in a male dominated story, they are usually there to be someone’s wife, treated like property or a whore and in some instances, all three. So, as a way to be original, Chaucer took this opportunity to use a female character that is unlike any other in his time. Except that her tale does exactly what it sets up not to: it rewards a man for being a brute. The Wife of Bath is supposedly a â€Å"strong female character,† but Chaucer fails to show how her character has value s that defy those of the average medieval person. The only obvious differences between the Wife of Bath’s tale versus her male counterparts is her perspective as a woman. The Wife of Bath offers a lengthy and detailed sexual and marital history for herself which preludes a short story detailing a knight’s supposed conversion. These two tales are directly related— the Wife of Bath’s favorite husband is the one who abused her and the knight in her tale is a repented rapist. It would beShow MoreRelatedAnalysis Of The Poem The Wife Of Bath Essay873 Words   |  4 PagesAnalytical Essay on the â€Å"Wife of Bath.† Question One Description of the Wife of Bath in terms of her progressive feminism, rhetoric style, and her prolog tale. Comparison of her as a women attitude towards general medieval attitude towards women. â€Å"Wife of Bath† Tale provides insight and understanding of the women change and their view mainly in matters of family, marriage, authority and marital affairs. The Prolog is double the size of her Tale, a lot of information about marriage group is givenRead MoreFeminist Analysis Of The Wife Of Bath 1419 Words   |  6 PagesFeminism in the Wife of Bath The story of the Wife of Bath provides an insight to the role women were expected to play during the late middle ages. In the Prologue, Alice narrates her story guided by her life experience and religious beliefs. Alice is a reformed woman who goes against the patriarchal community’s expectation of women being suppressed by their men (Carter, 309). According to Kittredge (440), the wife of bath contradicts the church’s expectation that the wife should be loyal and holyRead MoreWife Of Bath Chaucer Analysis702 Words   |  3 Pagescontroversial characters, the Wife of Bath. Dame Alison, the Wife of Bath, gained her notoriety by deviating from the normal ideals of women in this time period. While most women in this time period were expected to be obedient to their husbands, Alison demands the submission of men her relationships. Like all of Chaucer’s characters, Dame follows her prologue by telling her own story, which directly parallels her own morals and belie fs. As seen in her prologue, the Wife of Bath was first married off whenRead MoreCharacter Analysis of the Wife of Bath1755 Words   |  8 Pagesextensive stories comes from the character, The Wife of Bath. Initially, she is described in short as a well-dressed woman who knew much about love and life. â€Å"Of remedies of love she knew per chaunce,/ For she koude of that art the olde daunce† (Chaucer, GP, 475-476). Upon further examination of her prologue and tale, one comes to find that she may be one the most intriguing characters represented in the Canterbury Tales. Everything about the Wife of Bath is bold and pronounced, from what she wearsRead MoreAnalysis Of The Poem The Wife Of Bath 1754 Words   |  8 PagesBecca Edmondson AP English 12 Mrs. Price Research Paper The Wife of Bath The Wife of Bath is unlike the other women of her time to some extent, yet simultaneously is a member of a certain group of individuals. Although this is taking place in the fourteenth century, surprising as it is, the Wife of Bath fits into the society through her uniqueness. In Chaucer’s tales the women of this time were not portrayed as one might imagine. Many believe the women of the fourteenth century were housewives whoRead MoreCritical Analysis Of The Wife Of Bath1521 Words   |  7 Pagesauthority regarding their morality, spirituality, and economic and social positioning. Biblical symbols caused a misrepresentation of women and were highly regarded in the suppressing of the female voice and their value outside of being a wife and mother. â€Å"The Wife of Bath’s Tale† provides one of the most intriguing medieval cultural insights to gender studies. The reader joins a pilgrimage with the Canterbury Tale’s most audacious and sexually unrestricted f emale narrators who also gives a personalRead MoreWife of bath character analysis1148 Words   |  5 Pagestime, even in the past abuse like this existed, but there wasn’t a term for it, especially if it was your wife. Likely you would be told that she’s a little rambunctious or noisy and she will calm down, but that may not be the problem. The Wife of Bath in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales can be classified as an abuser by the methods she uses to control her husbands. Emotional abuse is the Wife of Bath’s greatest tool against her first husbands. In the Wife’s Prologue, she tells of the accusationsRead MoreAnalysis Of The Poem The Wife Of Bath Essay1247 Words   |  5 PagesAnalytical Essay on the â€Å"Wife of Bath.† By Chaucer’s time, the antifeminism tradition was very strong and had grown up. Her faith on marriage is surprising to men, especially during that period of time. She is a skilled woman, and knows how to defend her views on marriage and sex, in which she blows the idealistic of antifeminism by interpreting the bible to her benefit. And, when someone in authority disagrees with her, she relies on her experience. â€Å"Wife of Bath† Tale provides insight and understandingRead MoreWife Of Bath Prologue Analysis1130 Words   |  5 PagesThe Wife of Bath’s Prologue The Wife of Baths Prologue On my paper, I decided to do the wife of Baths Prologue to the song lyrics I Do by Colbie Caillat. The first stanza says: Its always been about me, myself, and I I thought relationships were nothing but a waste of time I never wanted to be anybodys other half I was happy saying I had a love that wouldnt last That was the only way I knew til I met you In the Wife of Bath, Chaucer has rolled the ultimate outrageous medieval stereotypeRead MoreAnalysis Of The Poem The Wife Of Bath Essay2305 Words   |  10 PagesThe theme of matrimony in the Wife of Bath’s Prologue as well as in the Miller’s Tale does not fit in with traditional fourteenth-century culture. The characters in these two texts turn what is suppose to be a sacred unity into a promiscuous and taboo fantasy for pilgrims. The characters narrating these two tales promote the idea of what fourteenth-century canon law would define as adultery—to have had a third lover while married is the new societal trend for the characters in these tales. And so

American History-Cold War Free Essays

This work is an effort to acknowledge the Korean War. This is not an attempt to provide a history. The purpose of this work is to consider the argument that the Korean War was a natural extension of the Cold War and would not have been fought if relations with the U. We will write a custom essay sample on American History-Cold War or any similar topic only for you Order Now S and Russia/China were not cold. Many see the Korean War as a mystery. Some parts of it seem almost immune to study and understanding. Statistics tell some things, and chronological narratives can provide a story upon which to hang data and factual information. But the problem is simply that people still do not know very much about the war. It was so complex, both in terms of its causes, and of the progress of the fighting, that the usual methods of reporting do not always tell a clear story. It was (and is) a significant part of American history, and within it are located keys to understanding America’s highly transitional role in the increasingly complex world events of the time. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was one of the great sea changes in postwar American history. Like the Trojan horse sent into Troy, President Harry S. Truman’s June 1950 decision to intervene in the Korean crisis laid the nation bare to a bombardment of economic, political, military, and social changes. As it turned out, the Korean mobilization went far beyond preparations for America’s first undeclared war; it evolved into the nation’s de facto Cold War preparedness program, which came to span nearly forty years. The Korean War, which began with the invasion of the Republic of South Korea in June of 1950, can be more easily understood if we consider it as two, perhaps even three, wars. The first phase was between the United Nations and the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea. This period can be considered a victory for the United Nations. Surely there is no other word for the successful landing at Inchon in September 1950, the recapture of the South Korean capital of Seoul, and the approach, by Eighth Army on the west and X Corps on the east, to the Yalu. By the middle of November, the forces of the United Nations had scattered the troops of North Korea’s army and occupied most of its territory. The goals of the United Nations, to drive the invader from South Korea, had been accomplished. The second phase, which General of the Army Douglas MacArthur called â€Å"an entirely new war,† began with the Chinese entry into the conflict. This phase must be considered much less successful. In the light of the goals established for the second stage of the war – to expel the Communist Chinese and to occupy and control the territory of North Korea – the war was a failure. But somewhere during the second year of fighting, around November 1951, the nature of the goals changed again. This change may be sufficient to define a third phase of the war. The third phase was marked by the decision to take a defensive posture in Korea. After the defeat at the Chosin reservoir and the slow United Nations return to the 38th Parallel military victory seemed to be too great a goal. The war became one of attrition, not unlike World War I. The third phase was one of waiting, patrolling, skirmishing, destroying supplies, and attacking to kill rather than to occupy, and negotiating. If the legitimate purpose of war is to create a more perfect peace, as some have suggested, then phase three of the Korean War was its most important. Certainly the long-term goals, as well as the short-term reactions, seemed to be more directed at an easing of the Cold War than at victory in Korea. The decision made by President Harry S. Truman and his advisors to enter the war in defense of South Korea was one of major significance. Some historians believe it may have been predetermined by earlier events leading up to the invasion. On the surface, however, the decision looks like a rather abrupt shift in the administration’s policy concerning Korea. The reaction gave Korea more importance than it had previously held for Americans. Later, when Truman authorized General MacArthur to move across the 38th, and seek the occupation of North Korea, that decision did not appear so much out of character. In the final analysis, however, this latter decision introduced a period of military defeat, public concern, and political difficulty. There is much about the fighting during the Korean War that, in an overview, appears paradoxical. The tremendous technological advances made during World War II paid off between 1945 and 1955. Weapon development moved quickly and weapons became more and more complex. Nevertheless, the Korean War was primarily fought with weapons left over from World War II. To a significant degree it was also fought with the strategies and often with the commanders, of that war. It was war fought in the beginning by untrained and unprepared occupation troops, then by â€Å"retreads† (recalled World War II veterans), then by draftees caught up in one of the loosest conscription nets in modern history. Of course, it was a war in which military methodology and expectancy were severely limited. Finally, we can say that the Korean War verified Clausewitz’s understanding that a limited war can be true to its defined goals only as long as it remains subject to political (civilian) control. The Korean War emphatically marked the end of the post-Second World War era. The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, the Greek civil war, the Czech coup, and the Berlin Airlift, not to mention the â€Å"loss† of China to the communists, had all served to erode what had remained of the wartime â€Å"Grand Alliance† between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union that had persisted through the war and to the establishment of the United Nations. But with American, British, French, Dutch, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African, Greek, Turkish, Filipino and Thai troops actually engaged in combat with Communist forces, the Cold War seemed obviously to have taken on a new and far more bitter dimension, and indeed, might no longer even merit the term â€Å"Cold War†. In the words of one scholar, â€Å"Without the Cold War there would have been no Korean War† (Mcmahon 69) In fact, the entry of China into the conflict in late 1950 unleashed apocalyptic imaginings of a Third World War, particularly amongst Americans. Even after the Armistice concluding the Korean War, the Cold War would continue for more than four decades. The Korean War marked a pivotal turning point in the global execution of the Cold War. To understand the larger context—the Cold War—is to understand how and why Korea fundamentally altered the political and economic scene in the United States. First, Korea marked the militarization of Harry Truman’s containment policy. Before June 1950, the United States tended to emphasize the economic aspects of containment, during which time it sought to build a strong, free-market—based international order to serve as a bulwark against Soviet communism. Once the war in Korea began, however, the United States emphasized military rearmament—here and abroad—to resist perceived Soviet aggression. Second, by militarizing containment as it did, the Truman administration globalized it as well. After Korea, the nation prepared itself ideologically and militarily to resist the Sovietsin every corner of the world. Thus, in the final analysis, the Korean mobilization was a mobilization within a mobilization: the nation began arming for the Korean conflict in the short-term while simultaneously mobilizing for the Cold War in the long-term. Division and Cold War came to Korea first and foremost because of the inability of outside powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to devise a unification plan that would protect the interests of both (Wainstock 36). From the start the two powers regarded internal political configurations as highly unpredictable, so they were disinclined to encourage creation of an indigenous government that crossed zonal boundaries. The best opportunity for the emergence of such a government came in September 1945 with the rise of the KPR, a group that possessed strong linkages with the people’s committees at the local level. Had the Americans supported the KPR, thus encouraging the KDP to play coalition rather than class politics, Koreans might have taken the lead in developing a vision of a united, independent country unthreatening to the great powers. Yet the best opportunity in this case does not represent a good opportunity, since such an outcome would have required extraordinary patience and trust on all sides, ingredients that were far from common at the time. The unexpected invasion ushered in a new and much more dangerous phase of the Cold War, not just in Asia but globally. Certain that the attack could only have occurred with the backing of the Soviet Union and China – a correct assessment, as nowavailable evidence confirms – and convinced that it heralded a bolder and more aggressive worldwide offensive by the communist powers, the Truman administration responded vigorously. It immediately dispatched US naval and air forces to Korea in order to stem the North Korean advance and bolster South Korean defences. When that initial intervention proved insufficient, the administration dispatched US combat troops, which became part of an international force owing to the UN’s condemnation of the North Korean invasion. ‘The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt’, declared Truman in a 27 June address to the American people, ‘that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will use armed invasion and war’ (Malkasian 21). He also revealed, in that same speech, that he was ordering the US Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, increasing aid to the French in Indo—China, and speeding additional aid to the pro—American Philippine government which was battling the radical Huk insurgency. Behind those four interventions – in Korea, China, Indo—China, and the Philippines – lay the American perception that a unified threat of formidable proportions was being mounted against Western interests by a hostile and newly aggressive world communist movement under the leadership of the Soviet Union and its Chinese junior partner. The impact of the Cold War on the Korean War is difficult to overstate. Not only did the Korean fighting lead to an intensification and geographical expansion of the Cold War, threaten a wider conflict between the United States and the communist powers, and foster increased East–West hostility, but it also spurred a huge increase in American defence spending and, more broadly, a militarization and globalization of American foreign policy. Beyond Asia, the conflict in Korea also hastened the strengthening of NATO, the arming of Germany, and the stationing of US troops on European soil. ‘It was the Korean War and not World War II that made the United States a world military—political power’, diplomat Charles Bohlen has argued. With uncommon unanimity, scholars have affirmed that judgement, identifying the Korean War as a key turning point in the international history of the postwar era. America’s ‘real commitment to contain communism everywhere originated in the events surrounding the Korean War’, contends John Lewis Gaddis. Warren I. Cohen calls it ‘a war that would alter the nature of the Soviet—American confrontation, change it from a systemic political competition into an ideologically driven, militarized contest that threatened the very survival of the globe’ (Anthony 42). Yet, as Cohen also notes, ‘that a civil war in Korea would provide the critical turning point in the postwar Soviet—American relationship, and raise the possibility of world war, seems, in retrospect, nothing short of bizarre’ (Ball 15). Certainly, in the aftermath of World War II, few places appeared less likely to emerge as a focal point of great power competition. Occupied and ruled by Japan as a colony ever since 1910, Korea factored into wartime councils merely as yet another minor and obscure territory whose future disposition fell on the Allies’ already overburdened shoulders. At the Potsdam Conference, the Americans and Soviets agreed to share occupation responsibilities there by temporarily dividing the country at the 38th parallel; they also agreed to work towards the establishment of an independent, unified Korea at the earliest practicable time. In December 1945, at a foreign ministers’ meeting in Moscow, the Soviets accepted a US proposal for the establishment of a joint Soviet—American commission to prepare for the election of a provisional Korean government as a first step toward full independence. But that plan soon fell victim to larger Cold War tensions that militated against any meaningful cooperation, or compromise, between Moscow and Washington. By 1948, the occupation divisions had instead hardened. In the north, a pro—Soviet regime under the leadership of the former antiJapanese fighter Kim took on all the trappings of an independent regime. So, too, did its counterpart in the south: a proAmerican regime headed by the virulently anti—communist Syngman Rhee, a Korean nationalist of long standing. Each side regularly rattled sabres at the other; neither North nor South Koreans could accept a permanent division of their homeland. In 1948, the Truman administration, seeking to extricate itself gracefully from its Korean commitment, began withdrawing US military forces from the peninsula. American defence planners believed not only that US military personnel had become overextended worldwide, necessitating this pullback, but that Korea, in fact, possessed minimal strategic worth. The North Korean invasion two years later brought a different calculus to the fore. Although it might have lacked great intrinsic strategic value, Korea stood as a potent symbol, especially in view of America’s role as midwife and protector of the Seoul regime. Further, the North Korean attack, sanctioned and backed by the Soviet Union and China, threatened America’s credibility as a regional and global power every bit as much as it threatened the survival of the South Korean government. To Truman, Acheson, and other senior decision—makers, the stakes at risk in Korea appeared enormous. Consequently, without any dissenting voices being raised, the president quickly authorized US military intervention. ‘If the United Nations yields to the force of aggression’, Truman declared publicly on 30 November, ‘no nation will be safe or secure. If aggression is successful in Korea, we can expect it to spread throughout Asia and Europe to this hemisphere. We are fighting in Korea for our own national security and survival’ (Roe 90) That statement came right after the entry of Chinese Communist ‘volunteer’ forces into the fray, a development that changed the character of the Korean conflict – and, arguably, the Cold War as well. Truman and his military advisers grew overconfident after MacArthur turned the tide of battle in September 1950 by outflanking the North Koreans with his legendary Inchon landing. The UN forces under his command crossed into North Korean territory on 7 October; by 25 October, some advance units reached the Yalu River, along the North Korean—Chinese border. As they inched closer to Chinese territory, Mao informed Stalin that he had decided to send Chinese troops across the Yalu. ‘The reason’, he explained, ‘is that if we allow the United States to occupy all of Korea and Korean revolutionary strength suffers a fundamental defeat, then the Americans will run more rampant to the detriment of the entire East. ’ Mao, too, saw broad regional and global implications in the Korean outcome. MacArthur, who had so cavalierly underestimated the Chinese military threat and whose forces were almost completely driven out of North Korea by the end of November, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff: ‘We face an entirely new war’ (Paige 12). The world faced an entirely new Cold War by that time as well, one whose boundaries reached well beyond Europe. The emergence of Mao’s regime in China, the Sino—Soviet alliance, Soviet and Chinese support for North Korean adventurism, the intervention of US and UN forces in Korea, the subsequent entry of Chinese troops, the presence of communist elements within Southeast Asia’s nationalist movements – all ensured that the Cold War would remain a commanding presence in postwar Asia for a long time to come. The Korean War itself dragged on inconclusively until July 1953, when the warring parties signed an armistice that achieved little more than an exchange of prisoners—of—war and a return to the status quo ante bellum. The 38th parallel remained an ominous line of division – not just between North and South Korea, but between the Eastern and Western blocs. With the Korean conflict, the Cold War became increasingly global in scope. In the decade that followed the onset of the Korean fighting, few corners of the world managed to escape the ensnaring web of superpower rivalry, competition, and conflict. Indeed, the principal international flashpoints of the 1950s and 1960s – Iran, Guatemala, Indo—China, the Taiwan Strait, Suez, Lebanon, Indonesia, Cuba, the Congo – lay well beyond the Cold War’s original boundaries. Only Berlin, whose contested status triggered Soviet–American crises in 1958 and again in 1961–2, belongs to the set of immediate post—World War II disputes that precipitated the East–West breach in the first place. From the standpoint of the great power struggle, the grounds for defending South Korea were strong. It was believed that if the North Korean aggression succeeded, Indo-China would be almost certain to fall under Communist control, with the aid of whatever Chinese forces were necessary. The snowballing effect of Communist triumphs might make Thailand and Burma relatively easy conquests. Since Indo-China is strategically the key to all South East Asia, the stubborn communist guerrilla movement in Malaya might be expected to gain momentum, with aid from the north, and gun-running to the Huks in the Philippines would not be too difficult. Both in the Philippines and Japan, also, the psychology of Red success would operate powerfully. In the end it might be difficult to hold Japan, especially since she cannot exist, apart from American doles, in the absence of trade with China and South East Asia. As in every crisis of the Cold War, the image of the falling dominoes was allowed free rein. Thus far the Truman Doctrine had been enforced in Europe, but it had been a dismal failure in East Asia. If now the tremendous triumph of communism in China were capped by further Red gains in Asia the effect on Europe might be decisive. In the United States, too, the result might well be decisive politically for the Truman Administration. Its foes were already making capital bitterly about the non-enforcement of the Doctrine in China. If it collapsed in Asia there would be a mighty outcry indeed. A stage in the Cold War had come which seemed to compel a defense of the Doctrine in Asia. These considerations were sufficient to induce resolute action in Korea, without going to the defense of the United Nations. Up to this time enforcement of the United Nations Charter had not been a compelling motive in Washington. The UN was brushed aside in Greece, and independent action taken to defeat the Communist guerrillas. In Indonesia the United States had brought strong moral pressure to bear on the Netherlands in the Security Council, but no troops and planes were sent to fight the Dutch when they defied a UN cease fire order. Nor did the United States mobilize the UN to save the infant Israeli Republic when five Arab states invaded Palestine in 1948 to overturn by force the partition plan adopted by the UN General Assembly. Defiance of the United Nations could not have been more flagrant, but the United States moved no troops and planes to save the victims of Hitler’s hate who had gathered in Israel, and who appeared to be on the point of being destroyed by the armies of UN members converging on them from all sides. In the end Israel was saved by her own heroic fighting, with arms obtained largely from communist Czechoslovakia. The United States gave no armed support to Israel as the ward of UN. The Koreans did not ask for the division of their country, even temporarily. They also organized a government which was broadly representative and quite capable of governing the country. But neither the U. S. S. R. nor the U. S. A. would permit this government to function. Each insisted on creating a government for half the country in its own image. In this attempt the Soviets succeeded, but the United States brought a twenty-year emigre back to Korea and permitted him to build himself up into a lifetime despot capable of inviting the American people in their own capital to join him in self destruction. Division having resulted and hardened, two successive attempts to unite Korea by force were made, but the outcome was a great power war which nearly destroyed Korea and did not significantly alter the division of the country. On the contrary, the division was hardened and South Korea was left an overpopulated, undernourished, unviable country, existing only on the military dole of the United States and under a police state government which was a standing invitation to revolution – Red or otherwise. To highlight the argument, it is necessary to review the years 1945 through 1948. There can be no more striking reflection of Korea’s dependence on others than the decision to divide the peninsula into occupation zones in 1945. Koreans had no input in the decision because they had no recognized government or armed forces to defend their interests. They had been swallowed up in the Japanese empire early in the century and were now being freed from that status because of Japan’s defeat in a war in which Koreans had contributed more to the losing than to the winning side. Prospects for the peaceful unification of Korea from August 1945 onward were between slim and nil. The first step toward June 25, 1950, had been taken by the great powers—alone. Koreans in 1945 were deeply split among themselves—between close collaborators with the Japanese and underground dissenters; between landowners and peasants; between businessmen and factory workers; between police and civilians. These divisions had festered beneath the surface before 1945, as the Japanese used the strategy of divide and conquer to ease the task of ruling Korea. The collaborationist issue aside, many of the disputes were foreshadowed in the divisions among exiled independence groups. After liberation from Japan they burst into the open on the peninsula itself. Their existence eliminated any chance for a united indigenous resistance to the country’s partition by outsiders. Yet the particular form the divisions took and the ultimate outcome of the resulting conflicts were deeply influenced, indeed often determined, by the foreign presence. That the exiled groups during the Japanese period had looked to outsiders for assistance—Nationalist China and the United States in the case of the Right, the Soviet Union and Communist China in the case of the Left—and that one of the outsiders on each side now occupied half of Korea greatly magnified the problem. The trusteeship issue represented an extreme case, since it was totally created by the outsiders. Although the Soviets were able to keep the Korean Left in line on trusteeship, the Americans never persuaded the indigenous Right to support it—or even to exercise restraint in attacking it. Ultimately the United States gave in to Syngman Rhee and abandoned trusteeship, but only because, by September 1947, he represented the best hope for keeping South Korea out of Communist hands, an important U. S. objective in its own right. By the end of 1948, two indigenous governments existed on the peninsula, one exercising authority above the thirty-eighth parallel, one below it, one leftist in orientation and aligned with the Soviet Union, the other rightist and aligned with the United States. It is impossible to imagine this result without the Soviet-American agreement of 1945. If the situation in Korea at the end of 1948 cannot be grasped without reference to the foreign presence since 1945, it is also fair to say that the picture is incomplete without mention of the civil conflict that had waxed and waned below the thirty-eighth parallel since the fall of 1946. The unrest began in September with strikes and riots by workers in several cities and soon spread to the countryside, where landlords became frequent objects of attack. Hundreds of civilians and police died in the turmoil. The Left lost heavily in the violence, and for the next year, while unrest was widespread at the village level, it appears not to have been as well coordinated as before. The violence picked up greatly during 1948, with the biggest revolt against government authority beginning in April on Cheju Island. By the end of the year, guerrillas operated extensively on the mainland, so much so that the United States decided to postpone withdrawal of the last of its combat troops from the South. Six of South Korea’s eight provinces eventually saw substantial guerrilla activity, which peaked in the fall of 1949 and subsided in the spring of 1950 as a result of strong counteraction by ROK forces. Violence in the South from late 1946 to mid-1950 brought death to some one hundred thousand Koreans. If the Americans were instrumental in suppressing the activity, the Soviets played an integral role in fostering it. Although the general strike in South Korea of September 1946 appears to have begun at the initiative of the Korean Communist Party below the thirty-eighth parallel, the Soviets soon took an active part, giving advice, which the southern rebels often solicited, encouragement, and considerable financial aid. The Soviets also pushed successfully for the merger of the three leftist parties in the two zones and participated in the training and infiltration of North Korean agents and guerrillas into the South. The unrest in South Korea grew in part out of local conditions, but neither its origins nor its course can be understood without devoting heavy attention to activities originating in the North or to actions heavily influenced by the Soviet and American presence on the peninsula. The local, national, and international forces blended together in a manner that would have made the actual course of events largely unrecognizable with the elimination of any of the three (Stueck 44). On June 25, 1950 NorthKorea invaded South Korea. The invasion was less important in actual strategic terms than in what it symbolized: a confirmation of the aggressive nature of Soviet communism. President Truman attached this symbolism immediately to the war. In his statement issued on June 27 the president declared: â€Å"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war† (Lowe 120). In response he ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa, sought U. S. condemnation of the North’s aggression, and eventually committed U. S. military forces under the auspices of the United Nations to fight the Korean War. The cold war had suddenly turned into a hot war. But it was a hot war of a peculiar kind. In fact, it was the new face of war in the postwar world. The Korean War was a proxy war fought in Korea but symbolizing the worldwide struggle between the free world and the communist world. If the North Korean invasion symbolized communists’ intentions to dominate the world, the U. S. response symbolized the resolve of the United States to resist Soviet domination. It was a critical moment. Metaphysical symbolism replaced tangible objectives as the focal point of war. Such a transcendental transformation had its roots in the original request of economic aid to Greece and Turkey, but it was to have consequences that would reach to the rice paddies of Vietnam. The anticommunism rhetoric was now pervasive and complete. Politicians and people interpreted the meaning of each of these three sets of events – the Hiss conviction and the other charges of domestic communist activities, the invasion of South Korea by the North, and the Chinese intervention into that war – by the standards of that rhetoric and at the same time used these events as proof that the rhetoric was correct in the first place. It was a classic tautology. Understanding and proving arose simultaneously and led to action. And action confirmed the understanding and proof. The Korean War was the linchpin of these final proofs. John Lewis Gaddis (1983) remarked that the widely shared but erroneous impression that the invasion of South Korea was the first military step in the Soviet Union’s plan to conquer the world had three important consequences: (1) the transformation of NATO from â€Å"a traditional mutual defense alliance into a[n] integrated military structure† that led to the appointment of a U. S. supreme commander of NATO and the stationing of U. S. troops in Europe; (2) the rearming of West Germany and the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, thus making alliances with old enemies to fight a new enemy; and (3) the approval of National Security Memorandum No. 68, better known as NSC-68 (32). Perhaps the only issue on which the United States and China had significant common interests concerns the Korean peninsula. Washington and Beijing had a strong interest in preventing North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons. Not only would a nuclear-armed North Korea make a North-South war far more dangerous, but it might also encourage South Korean and Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons and cause a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. Thus, at times Beijing has applied economic pressure on North Korean rulers, assisting U. S. efforts to compel Pyongyang to curtail its nuclear program. Indeed, Chinese policy toward nuclear proliferation into North Korea was one Chinese policy that consistently drew praise from Washington for having â€Å"concerns similar† to America’s and for playing â€Å"an important cooperative role† and providing â€Å"critical cooperation† in U. S. efforts to freeze North Korea’s nuclear program. China has also been supportive of U. S. efforts to bring about North Korean participation in the four-party peace talks involving the two Koreas, China, and the United States (Guttmann 59). The United States and China also shared an interest in preventing economic and political instability in North Korea from leading to war between the two Koreas. China has contributed to this common objective of a â€Å"soft† rather than a â€Å"crash landing† of the North Korean government by encouraging Pyongyang to open its economy to foreign trade and investment and by supplying it with subsidized energy resources. As the North Korean economy rapidly deteriorated, Beijing supplied Pyongyang with emergency food and clothing supplies. Since then, Beijing has continued to provide North Korea with food, consumer goods, and energy assistance. But even U. S. -China relations on this relatively cooperative issue had tensions. Whereas Washington’s policy toward North Korea was primarily focused on preventing nuclear proliferation, Beijing’s policy attached equal weight to its vital interest in preserving its significant influence in a border state located at the intersection of all of the great powers. Moreover, Beijing had even greater interest than Washington in preventing war on the Korean peninsula, insofar as it would be waged on China’s border and could spill over into Chinese territory. U. S. China friction results from Washington’s frustration when Chinese caution inhibits Beijing from applying greater pressure on the North Korean leadership. Thus far, U. S. -China common interests in regional stability have prevailed, but should the U. S. -North Korean agreement collapse, U. S. -China tension over North Korea could intensify. The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula was, in part, a holdover from the Cold War. It stemmed, ultimately, from the division of the country and the threat to the status quo posed by the Communist regime in the north – the same set of circumstances that had led to war in 1950. The same dictator – Kim II-sung-who had launched the attack in 1950 was in power and threatening to acquire nuclear weapons in 1994. The problem of North Korean nuclear weapons produced a political alignment in the region that demonstrated the differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War eras in yet another way. In 1950 the United States and Japan were allied with South Korea against North Korea, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China (Buzo 89). Korea has common borders with both Russia and China. All four powers participated, directly or indirectly, in the Korean War of the 1950s. The Korean War was extension of the conflict in and the Cold War, at least in American eyes. North Korea, China, and later Vietnam were seen in Washington as part of a single Communist bloc, all allies and instruments of Moscow. A scenario suggests that the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Communist China conspired to begin a war in Asia. The North Korean invasion of South Korea was the opening move in a Communist offensive for worldwide domination. However, while it is fairly certain that Premier Mao Tsetung and Stalin were both aware of North Korea’s decision to invade, there is less evidence that the nations involved were acting under the aegis of international communism. In fact, failure to understand the difference between national and international communism is a significant part of the inability of the United Nations to comprehend the depth of the problem it faced. The actual element of conspiracy, it there was one, may have been in the willingness of major political powers to use small and vulnerable nations in the Cold War. That is, the Korean War simply have been a convenient battleground for one more clash between nations who did not have the courage to take on each other openly. Works Cited Anthony, Farrar-Hockley. â€Å"The China Factor in the Korean War†. In The Korean War in History ed. James Cotton and Ian Neary. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989. Ball, S. J. The Cold War: An International History, 1947-1991. Arnold: London, 1998. Buzo, Adrian. The Making of Modern Korea. Routledge: New York. , 2002. Gaddis John Lewis. â€Å"The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War†. Diplomatic History 7 (Summer 1983): 171-90. Guttmann, Allen. Korea and the Theory of Limited War. D. C. Heath: Lexington, MA, 1967. Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean Conflict. Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1999. Lowe, Peter. The Origins of the Korean War. London: Longmann, 1986. Malkasian, Carter. A History of Modern Wars of Attrition. Praeger: Westport, CT, 2002. Mcmahon, Robert. The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press: Oxford, England, 2003. Paige, Glenn D. The Korean Decision. New York: Free Press, 1968. Ridgway, M. B. The Korean War, Garden City, NY, 1967. Roe, Patrick C. The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War, June-December 1950. Presidio Press: Novato, CA, 2000. Sandler, Stanley. The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished. UCL Press: London, 1999. Stueck, William. Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 2002. Wainstock, Dennis D. Truman, Macarthur and the Korean War. Greenwood Press: Westport, CT, 1999. How to cite American History-Cold War, Papers

Supply Chain Assignment free essay sample

Supply Chain Management transformation is a strategic imperative for any manufacturer. This process is very importance because it sees all suppliers and customers as part of one complex supply chain network and understands that transforming that supply chain into a synchronized chain is the primary goal. Supply chain management transformation provides fast access to relevant and accurate information. This timely supply chain information can pay off handsomely in lower costs, less inventory, improved throughput, shorter cycle times, and the highest levels f customer service. The very essence of supply chain management is effective information and material flow throughout a network of customers and suppliers (Donover, 2010). In order for Riordan Manufacturing to gain/or maintain its place as a cutting edge manufacturing company. Riordan must extend their management of physical logistics to address the entire supply chain process, from supplier to buyer, in order to shorten product life cycles, increase competition, and meet the heightened expectations of customers. We will write a custom essay sample on Supply Chain Assignment or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page There are clear opportunities for making supply chains more cost effective, more transparent and more responsive to improve customer service. Four key areas are critical for effective supply chain improvement: process, measurement, information management and technology. Best practice in these areas includes (Provey, 2009): A. Integrating internal functional processes and systems across the enterprise. This includes the physical supply chain execution and management processes: * Customer service management Demand management * Materials and Production planning * Logistics and inventory management * Order Fulfillment * Sourcing and Procurement * Supplier management * Product development and commercialization B. Collaborating with suppliers and customers, involves sharing information and integrating intercompany processes to improve resource utilization and to enhance end-consumer satisfaction across the supply chain as a whole C. Automating management and execution processes, such as order tracking, online purchasing and aterials and production planning. This allows cost, time and waste to be taken out of the supply chain To engage in business improvement initiatives the benefits from such initiatives include improving customer service, greater efficiency, lower inventory costs shorter cycle and lead times, and reduced supply chain complexity (Povey, 2009). Objective 1 Improvement Assessment and Analysis Define opportunities based on operations strategy and performance shortfalls